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Abstract,  
Contrary to widely shared opinion in analytic metaphysics, E.J. Lowe argues against the existence of 
relations in his posthumously published paper There are probably no relations (2016). In this article, 
I assess Lowe’s eliminativist strategy, which aims to show that all contingent “relational facts” have 
a monadic foundation in modes characterizing objects. Second, I present two difficult ontological 
problems supporting eliminativism about relations. Against eliminativism, metaphysicians of science 
have argued that relations might well be needed in the best a posteriori motivated account of the 
structure of reality. Finally, I argue that, by analyzing relational inherence, trope theory offers us a 
completely new approach to relational entities and avoids the hard problems motivating 
eliminativism. 
 
1. Introduction  
It has been a widely shared view in analytic metaphysics that we need to postulate relations in order 
to provide an adequate account of reality. For instance, concrete objects are spatio-temporally related 
in various ways and the spatio-temporal arrangement of objects is contingent relative to their 
existence and monadic properties. Here the most straightforward conclusion is that there are 
additional entities, spatio-temporal relations, which account for objects’ being spatio-temporally 
related in different ways. Similarly, influential metaphysicians of science have maintained that 
relations figure among the fundamental constituents of reality according to reasonable interpretation 
of the best physical theories (Teller 1986, Butterfield 2006). In contradistinction with this wide-spread 
enthusiasm about relations, certain prominent metaphysicians have recently denied the existence of 
relations or similarly structured relational entities (Campbell 1990; Heil 2012; Simons 2014, 2016). 
In his posthumously published paper There are probably no relations (2016), E.J. Lowe joins the 
ranks of eliminativists about relations. According to Lowe, in addition to substances and kinds, there 
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are only “monadic” modes and attributes. There are contingent relational truths, but they all have a 
non-relational truthmaker. 
 In this paper, I will argue that the eliminativism about relations Lowe and these other 
metaphysicians advocate has a strong initial motivation. As does Lowe, I will assume that the 
proposed relations connecting distinct objects are relational modes, particular relations relating (i.e. 
relationally inhering in) certain specific objects.1 Relational modes face two problems, which are hard 
to solve. The first main problem concerns the location of relations as parts of concrete reality. If 
relational modes are assumed to be parts of the realm of concreta, they are supposed have some 
spatial/spatio-temporal location. Nevertheless, the standard conception of relational modes does not 
give us any resources to determine their spatial, temporal or spatio-temporal location. The second 
problem is the non-modal version of Bradley’s relation regress. Here, the main claim is constitutive: 
assume that relation R relates two or more entities. According to the main claim, R’s relating certain 
distinct entities is itself based on the fact that R is related to its relata by additional relations. A vicious 
infinite regress ensues. Although the friends of relations may claim that relations are primitively 
relating entities, the non-modal Bradley’s relation regress puts the existence of all relating relations 
in jeopardy. 
 Moreover, I will assess Lowe’s (2016) own eliminativist strategy, which is based on the 
insight that all contingent “relational facts” have a monadic foundation in modes characterizing 
objects. Thus, Lowe attempts to avoid the postulation of relational modes. Nevertheless, Lowe’s 
strategy is based on fairly strong general assumptions about the structure of space, for instance. As I 
will argue, it would be an additional strength of an ontological category system to be able to allow 
for the existence of relations or relation-like entities. I argue that one can deal with two major 
difficulties on relational modes without recourse to eliminativism, by analysing relational inherence. 
Such analysis can be carried out in the context of trope theory SNT, as a generalization of the trope 
theoretical analysis of monadic inherence. This offers us an additional reason to adopt trope ontology 
instead a category system introducing primitive substances and the inherence relation. 
 Almost all metaphysicians admit that there are relational facts about entities, which need not 
be “grounded” by the inherence of relational entities.2 For instance, two entities can be distinct 
without there being a third entity, the relation of distinctness that “makes” them distinct. In section 
                                                          
1 WIeland & Betti (2008) and Maurin (2010, 2011) have also advocated relational modes, cf. Keinänen (2018, 166-168). 
I do not consider Russellian relation universals directly instantiated by objects here. However, parallel problems can be 
addressed to them, cf. Keinänen, Hakkarainen & Keskinen (2016). 
2 In this article, I will use the notion of grounding loosely for metaphysical determination. Instead of assuming that 
grounding is primitive, we may clarify it in terms of generic identity, for instance, cf. Jani Hakkarainen’s article in this 
volume. 
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2, I will present a conception of different kinds of internal relations, which provides us with a 
principled account of relational facts that need not be “grounded” by the inherence of the 
corresponding relational entity. Section 3 illustrates how Lowe’s eliminativist strategy can be 
construed by leaning on this general conception. Section 4 discusses the two difficulties that can be 
addressed to the ontological positions assuming relational modes. Finally, in section 5, I show that 
the trope theoretical analysis of relational inherence offers us a new way out of these difficulties. 
 
2. Basic and derived internal relations   
There has been at least four different conceptions of internal relations present in the recent literature. 
I will not discuss these conceptions here because we have discussed most of them in detail elsewhere 
(Keinänen, Keskinen & Hakkarainen 2019, sec. 2).3 It is crucial to the view of internal relations 
presented in this article that internal relations are not any kind of relational entities, constituents of 
reality distinct from or additional to their relata. The corresponding relational predications indicate 
that entities are related in a certain way, but there is no relational entity that relates these beings. 
According to the existential conception of internal relations, entities e and f are internally 
related by relation R if and only if the holding of R is necessitated by the existence e and f.4 Our 
conception modifies the existential conception and might be therefore called “a modified existential 
conception”. Assume that certain relation R holds of holds of entities a1, …, an., these entities are 
related in a R-way. R is a proto internal relation if [PIR] holds. 
 
[PIR]: Necessarily, entities a1, …, an are related by proto internal relation R if and only if a1, …, 
an exist. 
 
On the plausible assumption that holding of a relation entails that its relata exist, all internal relations 
in the sense of the existential conception are proto internal, and vice versa. The simplest example is 
the proto internal relation of distinctness that holds between any two distinct entities. 
However, some internal relations hold due to entities being internally related to additional 
entities. For instance, according to Lowe’s four-category ontology, an electron exemplifies the 
attribute of –e charge because that electron instantiates the kind electron and the kind electron is 
characterized the attribute of –e charge. In a different kind of case, a particular rose exemplifies the 
                                                          
3 Cf. also Yates (2016). 
4 The existential conception of internal relations is advocated by Campbell (1990) and Mulligan (1998), for instance. 
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attribute of redness because it is characterized by a redness mode, which instantiates the attribute of 
redness. In both cases, the holding of the relation of exemplification is derivative from the holding of 
two more fundamental internal relations: characterization and exemplification. Moreover, an 
additional entity is involved in the “grounding” of the exemplification relation. The kind electron in 
the first case, a redness mode in the second. However, there is a difference in the modal status of the 
holding of exemplification. In the first case, it holds necessarily given the existence of its relata, in 
the second case, only contingently (Lowe 2012, 242-244). We have introduced the notion of derived 
internal relation to deal with cases like Lowe’s exemplification:  
  
[DIR]: Necessarily, entities a1, …, an are related by derived internal relation R if and only if the 
holding of R of a1, …, an is derivative from proto internal relations holding between entities some 
of which are distinct from a1, …, an. 
 
Some derived internal relations are proto internal, but some are not as was seen in the case of Lowe’s 
exemplification relation(s). Another kind of example of a derived internal relation drawn from trope 
ontology is the relation of having the same charge as between two electrons, which holds between 
two electrons because of they possess charge tropes that are connected by the relation of 1:1 
proportion (Keinänen, Keskinen & Hakkarainen 2019, secs. 2-3). While this derived internal relation 
holds necessarily if it is relata exist, Campbell’s (1990, sec. 5.8) founded external relations are 
derived internal relations that are contingent given the existence of their relata.    
 Thus, derived internal relations may or may not be proto internal. The essential thing with 
derived internal relations is that they need some entities additional to their relata in order to hold. Yet, 
derived internal relations must not be reified as relational entities: their holding is derivative from the 
holding of some proto internal relations. Nevertheless, there are basic internal relations, which hold 
in virtue of the sole existence of their relata: 
 
[BIR]: Necessarily, entities a1, …, an are related by basic internal relation R if and only if R is a 
proto internal relation and the holding of R of a1, …, an is not derivative from proto internal 
relations holding between entities some of which are distinct from a1, …, an. 
 
All basic internal relations are also proto internal. All proto internal relations are either basic internal 
or derived internal, but they cannot be both. In addition to being proto internal, basic internal relations 
hold in virtue of the sole existence of their relata.  This condition is expressed by the claim that the 
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holding of basic internal relations is not derivative from the holding of proto internal relations holding 
between entities some of which are additional to the relata of the original relation. 
Important examples of basic internal relations are formal ontological relations such as 
identity, distinctness and mereological relations (being part of, being disjoint of). In addition to 
identity, Lowe (2006, sec.3) takes instantiation, charecterization, composition and constitution as 
fundamental formal ontological relations in his four-category ontology. According to Lowe (2016, 
103) formal ontological truths are made true and necessitated by the existence of their relata.5 In 
addition to formal ontological relations, the exact similarity between two distinct redness modes is 
considered a basic internal relations in a substance mode ontology. The same can be said about the 
relations of less than exact resemblance between two property universals in an ontological position 
assuming universals. Similarly, we have argued that, in trope ontology, quantity tropes falling under 
a determinable are mutually connected by the basic internal relations of proportion and order. For 
instance, an e charge trope is in the relation of 3.1 proportion to every e/3 e trope (Keinänen, Keskinen 
& Hakkarainen 2019, sec. 3). Tropes are related by the relation of proportion because of being the 
particular natures they are. 
In the present paper, I will not take up the challenge of spelling out the details of the relevant 
kind of derivativeness figuring in [DIR] and [BIR]. There are, however, two important constraints on 
any suitable conception of derivativeness: first, derivativeness is modally as strong as metaphysical 
necessitation – a set of basic internal relations necessitates the holding of a derived internal relation. 
Second, the notion of derivativeness must be hyperintensional. A merely intensional notion, whose 
fineness of grain only reaches the level of metaphysical necessity, would be incapable of 
distinguishing between two different kinds of cases: (1) those in which an internal relation holds in 
virtue of some entities that are necessarily co-existent with but distinct from the relata (such as their 
necessary proper parts); and (2) those in which an internal relation holds in virtue of the mere 
existence of the relata. In (1), we are dealing with a derived internal relation, whereas in (2), we have 
a basic internal relation. 
 One might ask whether [DIR] is conductive to making all true contingent descriptive 
predications to express a derived internal relation. For instance, a1 and a2 are related by the relation 
of 1m distance if and only if the holding of 1m distance is derivate from proto internal relations 
holding between third entity a3 and a1, on the one hand, and a3 and a2, on the other. If the third entity 
a3 is a relational mode of 1m distance, a3 is assumed to stand in the internal relation of relational 
inherence to a1 and a2 (cf. section 5). The objection is correct, but a true relational predication 
                                                          
5 In final analysis, Lowe assumes that fundamental general essences determine formal ontological truths. However, in 
this article, I will omit this feature of Lowe’s views. 
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expressing inherence of a relation would express a limiting case of a derived internal relation. Here, 
it is not the relational predicate that refers to/corresponds to a relational entity but its function is 
syncategorematic: it applies to a relational mode and its relata, if the (alleged) formal ontological 
relation of relational inherence holds between them.6 Nevertheless, the relational fact is assumed to 
hold in virtue of the existence of a relational entity and its relata. 
 
3. Lowe’s eliminativist strategy 
There are two notable differences between how Lowe presents his eliminativist strategy and how the 
same strategy will be construed here. First, Lowe (2006, 101ff.) talks about relational truths or 
predications and their truthmakers. Second, he distinguishes between formal and material predicates. 
The former do not denote to a corresponding entity (universal), whereas the latter do (ibid). By 
contrast, I have kept the “material mode” by talking about internal relations and their relata. 
Moreover, as I indicated in the previous paragraph, all relational predications can be seen as 
syncategorematic, not just the formal ones. 
These differences are fairly easy to overcome. One can say that corresponding to a formal 
ontological relation, we can construct a formal ontological relational predication, which is made true 
by the existence the relata of the formal ontological relation. By talking about “formal ontological 
relations”, one avoids the semantic ascend. By the same token, one avoids the need to take stand on 
the difficult related issues like the nature of primary truth-bearers. Similarly, one can talk about basic 
internal relations instead of the corresponding relational truths. 
Moreover, Lowe construes certain predicates as expressions denoting to universals. Drawing 
from the tradition of term logic, he takes predicates as expressions which are names of the 
corresponding universals. The names of objects and modes denote to objects and modes. In this 
approach, we need additional expressions like “instantiates”, “is characterized by”, “exemplifies” to 
construct complete sentences, which indicate the formal relations in which particulars and universals 
are (Lowe 2013, sec.4). By contrast, standard predicate logic treats predicates as “unsaturated” 
expressions, which can be made complete sentences by adding one or more singular terms. In the 
present paper, I conceive all predicates in this standard way as unsaturated expressions. They can be 
used to describe the holding of internal relations between entities. 
 We can now apply Lowe’s eliminativist strategy to formal ontological relations. Assuming 
that we can consider Lowe’s instantiation and characterization fundamental formal ontological 
                                                          
6 Cf. Smith (2005, secs. 19-20) for this kind of approach. 
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relations, they hold in virtue of the existence of their relata (Lowe 2016, 102-103). By contrast, the 
holding of exemplification requires that certain entities additional to its relata exist, it is a derived 
internal relation in our terms (Lowe 2016, 104). 
 Derived internal relations expressed by material predications figure in a central place in 
Lowe’s eliminativist strategy, which aims to show that all contingent relational facts have a monadic 
foundation. According to Lowe, all derived internal relations expressed by material predication hold 
in virtue of the existence of entities and their monadic modes. We need not postulate any relational 
modes. However, there are very different kinds of such relational facts. In some cases, it is fairly clear 
that a relational fact has a monadic foundation. Consider the relation of having the same height as 
between Tom and Sally (Lowe 2016, 105-106). Assuming that there are monadic height modes, this 
relation holds because Tom is characterized by height mode m1 and Sally is characterized by height 
mode m2, and m1 and m2 are exactly similar height modes. Here, characterization is a basic internal 
relation between objects and modes and exact similarity is a basic internal relation between modes. 
One may also interpret Lowe to take exact similarity as a derived internal relation between modes, 
which holds because m1 and m2 are instances of the same height universal, the property universal of 
179cm length, for instance.7 Whichever way we interpret Lowe here, being of the same height as is a 
derived internal relation between its relata. 
 Nevertheless, Lowe applies the same eliminativist strategy to causal and spatial relations. It 
is certainly less clear that we need not introduce any relational modes to function as a (partial) 
foundation of these relations. Let us consider causal relations first. Here, Lowe (op. cit., 107-8) adopts 
a causal powers based account of causal relations. According to this view, the reciprocal power modes 
characterizing objects “ground” the causal relations between the corresponding objects. A causal 
relation holds between two objects because of the power modes of its relata and the essential rigid 
dependence of the additional manifestations modes of some of these substances on the power modes. 
For instance, assume that the water is causing some salt to dissolve in water. The holding of this 
causal relation between a sample of water and some salt is based on water’s power mode (to dissolve 
salt) and salt’s liability mode (to be dissolved in water). Moreover, the manifestation of these powers 
                                                          
7 ”And it can certainly be the case that these two height-modes are modes of the exactly the same universal (a certain 
determinate height universal, say height of five foot six inches), or that they are exactly similar height-modes. Whichever 
way one puts it, it will be an essential truth that those height-modes are modes of exactly the same universal, or are 
exactly similar to one another.” (Lowe 2016, 105-106) Here, Lowe seems to leave open which of these essential truths 
expresses the holding of a basic internal relation. 
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(the salt dissolving in water) is an additional mode of the salt, which is essentially rigidly dependent 
on the two power modes (ibid). 
According to Lowe’s view, causal relations need no relational modes to act as their 
foundation. The holding of causal relation is based on the existence of these three modes of the related 
objects and the basic internal relation of rigid dependence between the modes. Thus, causal relation 
seems to be a derived internal relation between the objects. Although Lowe’s account is interesting, 
it seems to leave the facts about spatial location and time largely implicit: for instance, one might 
claim that causes precede/are simultaneous to their effects in some spatial location. Modes and objects 
are concrete entities with some definite location, but no account of their relative locations is involved 
in the proposed view. This seems to leave question about whether there is a need to introduce some 
relational entities also in Lower’s power based account of causation an open issue. 
 Lowe (2016, 110-111) does offer us a non-relational account of the spatial location of objects 
preserving the intuitive basic idea that locations of objects are contingent relative to their existence 
and monadic properties. He regards space as an extended simple, an extended entity without proper 
parts, which is distinct from the objects occupying space. Thus, space is not divided into proper parts, 
regions with some definite boundaries. Rather, shapes are modes of objects, which are also their 
spatial boundaries. Objects do not stand in external occupation relations to the spatial regions they 
occupy (areas of space), but, rather, are characterized by certain modes, which are these regions and 
also constitute their boundaries (ibid). 
 Hence, in order to avoid relational modes, Lowe introduces “co-ordinate modes”, which are 
both shapes of objects and specify their locations in space. According to this view, spatial relations 
between objects are derived internal. For instance, objects a and b are in a 2 metre distance from each 
other because of a and b having their specific co-ordinate modes. The co-ordinate modes are locations 
of objects. Because of their nature, the co-ordinate modes are in certain spatial relations to all other 
co-ordinate modes. The relations of spatial distance between co-ordinate modes hold in virtue of the 
existence of their relata. In other words, they are basic internal relations between co-ordinate modes.  
 The type of account Lowe proposes to avoid spatial relations can probably be generalized to 
spatio-temporal relations. Nevertheless, many of its details remain unclear. According to Lowe, co-
ordinate modes are shapes of objects. Their main function is, however, to act as locations of objects.   
We may ask: what exactly is the co-ordinate nature of a certain mode? Any change in spatial relations 
between objects seems to entail that all co-ordinate modes of objects are replaced with new co-
ordinate modes (cf. MacBride 2016, sec.3). Is it possible to build such dependence on the modes of 
all other objects into the single monadic modes of particular objects? 
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4. Difficulties with relations 
Metaphysicians have provided some weighty reasons to reject relations and all relational entities. In 
this article, I consider two of them. The one is F.H. Bradley’s (1897) famous relation regress. Another 
is the general difficulty of determining the location of relations as parts of concrete reality. As does 
Lowe, I will assume that relations are relational modes. Like monadic modes (particular properties 
or the ways objects are), relational modes are particular relations or the ways objects are related. A 
relational mode of 1m distance relating a and b is a way objects a and b are related. As I have argued 
elsewhere (Keinänen 2018, sec.2), certain metaphysicians have recently defended relational modes, 
although calling them “relational tropes” (Wieland & Betti 2008, Maurin 2010, 2011).8 
 Consider again relational mode r of 1m distance relating objects a and b. Two clams hold true 
of these three entities (Keinänen 2018, 165): 
. 
1. Necessarily, if mode r exists, r relates (relationally inheres in) its specific relata, a and b. 
2. Necessarily, if relational mode r exists, its relata, a and b, also exist. To put this in formal 
ontological terms, mode r is multiply rigidly dependent (only) on its relata, a and b.9 
Claim 1 tells that relational modes are analogous to monadic modes. Necessarily, if a monadic mode 
exists, it characterizes a certain definite object. Similarly, necessarily, if a relational mode of 1m 
distance exists, it relates certain objects a and b in a certain way. Plausibly, if a relation relates certain 
relata, the relata must exist. Therefore, claim 1 entails claim 2. By contrast, the converse does not 
hold: 2 does not entail 1 (Keinänen 2018, 165-166). 
 The advocate of relational modes would consider relational inherence as a fundamental formal 
ontological relation holding between a relational mode and its relata. Thus, relational inherence would 
be a basic internal relation: necessarily, if relational mode r and its relata, a and b exist, r relationally 
inheres in its relata. In this respect, relational modes are completely analogous to monadic modes, 
which primitively characterize their bearers. Moreover, relational modes are considered to solve the 
                                                          
8 The main general difference between tropes and modes is the following: modes are assumed to stand in the 
fundamental formal ontological relation of inherence (characterization) to objects. By contrast trope theories attempt 
to analyse the inherence of tropes in objects by means of more fundamental relations (such as co-location, parthood 
and existential dependencies) (Keinänen 2018, sec.1).  
9 Let “≤ “  be a relation of improper parthood between entities and “E!” the predicate of (singular) existence. “SRD (e,f)” 
= e is strongly rigidly dependent on f. The multiple rigid dependence of t on f and g, ”MRD (t, (f, g)”, can be presented 
as follows: MRD (t, (f, g)) =  (E!t  (E!f  E!g  (f  t)  (g  t)  ¬(f  g)  ¬(g  f)))   ¬ ( E!f)  ¬ ( E!g)  ¬ 
(SRD(f, g))  ¬ (SRD (g, f)). 
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modal version of Bradley’s regress (the modal Bradley’s regress). The modal Bradley’s regress is 
premised on the claim that the existence of a relation and its relata does not entail that the relation 
holds between its relata. The modal Bradley’s regress is blocked because the existence of a relational 
mode is assumed to entail that the mode relates its specific relata (ibid). 
 The non-modal Bradley’s regress puts this very assumption in jeopardy. In other words, the 
possibility of there being any relational modes, that is, entities that stand in the basic internal relation 
of relational inherence to two or more entities, is contested. Here, I confine myself presenting the 
regress argument very briefly.10 Assume (counterfactually) that relation r relates two entities a and b 
and unifies them all into a complex entity rab. Thus, relation r holds between its relata, a and b. 
Relation r can hold between its relata and unify itself and its relata into a complex entity only if r is 
related to its relata by additional relations r’ and r’’. In other words, r’ra and r’’rb hold. Since the 
same reasoning can now be applied to these new entities, an infinite regress ensues. 
 Hence, the main claim in the non-modal Bradley’s regress is hypothetical and constitutive. If 
there are relational modes, each mode’s relating its relata is constituted by the holding of additional 
relations. An infinite regress of relational modes results because every mode’s relating has to be based 
on the existence of additional modes (i.e. holding of additional relations). The regress is vicious 
because the existence of each relational mode and its relating some distinct entities presupposes the 
existence of some new relational modes. We never reach the bottom level, in which there would only 
be some modes relating their relata. Since the assumption that there are relational modes leads to a 
vicious infinite regress, there cannot be relational modes. 
An advocate of relational modes might counter-assert the regress claim by maintaining that 
relational inherence is a fundamental formal ontological relation between a relational mode and its 
relata. Relational modes are basic entities of an ontological category system and it is their primitive 
formal ontological feature to relate their specific relata in a certain way. We need not introduce any 
additional entities. Nevertheless, nothing in this answer provides us with any independent reason to 
believe that there can be relational modes. In other words, that we are entitled to consider relational 
inherence a fundamental formal ontological relation between relational mode and its relata. As a 
consequence, we have not shown that particular relations connect their relata without themselves 
being involved in a vicious infinite regress (cf. MacBride 2011). 
 Another problem with relational modes concerns their location as parts of concrete reality. As 
Lowe (2016, 111-112) puts it, a relational mode would be an entity rigidly dependent on two distinct 
and mutually independent objects. For the sake of argument, consider 1m distance mode r relating 
                                                          
10 Bradley (1897, 27-28). For a detailed account of non-modal Bradley’s relation regress, see Hakkarainen & Keinänen 
MS, cf. also Perovic (2017).  
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John and Mary, which accounts for John being in a 1m distance from Mary. 1m distance mode r 
would be entirely distinct and mereologically disjoint from its bearers (John and Mary). John and 
Mary are distinct objects, but it seems that they do not themselves constitute a complex object. 
Consequently, unlike a monadic mode, the relational mode would not be an abstraction from any 
particular substance, it would not be “in” any substance. As Lowe (2016, 111) complains: 
 
A relation ‘accident’, if there could be such a thing, would not be ‘in’, or at least not wholly 
‘in’, any of its two or more ‘subjects’, nor even wholly in the totality of them. I 
consequently find it hard to conceive what such an entity could really be. 
Thus, distance mode r would not be ‘in’ its relata, John and Mary. The postulation of entities like the 
relational distance modes would not fit with the Neo-Aristotelian conception of modes. 
As an additional consequence of assuming relational modes, it would be hard to specify the 
spatial (or spatio-temporal) location of relational mode r. Unlike a monadic mode, relational mode r 
would not be co-located with any substance. Relational mode r would be a “weird” entity somewhere 
close to two distinct substances (cf. Simons 2003). The standard category systems assuming relational 
modes do not give us any additional resources to determine the location of relational modes. This 
puts the claim that relational modes are parts of the system of concrete entities, even if determining 
their relative locations, in jeopardy. On the other hand, assuming that relational modes are non-
spatiotemporal, that is, abstract, contradicts the reasonable claim that relational modes are concrete 
instances of relation universals. As a consequence, a category system introducing relational modes is 
seriously incomplete unless it can provide us with a more detailed account of the location of relational 
modes. 
 
5. The third way: analysis of relational inherence 
In addition to Lowe’s co-ordinate quality view, there are other interesting forms of eliminativism 
about relations. For instance, Peter Simons (2016) has suggested a process ontology and a causal 
theory of time in order to avoid the need for introducing relations to ground the spatio-temporal 
locations of entities.11 The assessment of different forms of eliminativism about relations is an 
interesting and unfinished project, but there are weighty reasons to keep the door open for relations 
or relation-like entities in an ontological category system. The first reason is that a relational theory 
of space or space-time is still an important option among the rival views. Since the relative locations 
                                                          
11 Cf. Keinänen (2018, sec.3) for a brief criticism of SImons’ eliminativism about relations. 
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of objects are contingent relative to their existence and monadic properties, one live option is to 
assume that space-time (or space) is constituted by relations or relation-like entities that connect the 
occupants of space. 
Second, recent metaphysicians of science have argued that the current physical theories 
provide us with independent reasons to postulate relations or relation-like entities. The current 
quantum physics introduces entangled states of two- or multi-particle systems, which are serious 
candidates for fundamental relations between particles (cf. Teller 1986; Karakostas 2009). For 
instance, Paul Teller (1986, sec.4) has argued that entangled spin-states of two superposed electrons 
are best considered relations, which do not supervene on the spatio-temporal arrangement and the 
monadic properties of these particles. Jeremy Butterfield (2006) argues that both classical and 
relativistic mechanics introduce fundamental quantities that should not be considered intrinsic 
properties of space-time points. We may need to introduce relations in order to account for some of 
such quantities. Finally, quantum field theories introduce interactions of particles mediated by virtual 
particles, which might also be considered relational entities. 
There is perhaps no single reason which could show that the eliminativism about relations is 
false. Nevertheless, independent considerations suggest that it is a reasonable strategy to allow for 
the existence of relations or relation-like entities in an adequate ontological category system. By the 
same token, one should remain critical to the standard ways in which relations are introduced in 
analytic metaphysics. Relational modes already avoid some of the difficulties one can attribute to 
Russellian relation universals (Maurin 2010, 2011; Keinänen, Hakkarainen & Keskinen 2015). As 
we saw above, however, the theories postulating relational modes have not provided any account of 
their location as parts of the realm of concreta. Secondly, the advocates of these views have not been 
able to show that relational modes are possible against the conclusion of the non-modal Bradley’s 
regress. 
 In what follows, I will argue that we can deal with both of these difficulties by analyzing 
relational inherence. The trope theoretical analysis of relational inherence aims to generalize the trope 
analysis of monadic inherence to “relational tropes”. In the analysis of monadic inherence, the 
inherence of a trope in an object is identified with the holding of certain other relations (like parthood, 
co-location, existential dependencies) between these entities. Similarly, a trope theory analyzing 
relational inherence identifies the facts about two or more entities being connected by a relation with 
the facts about the entities of the trope theoretical category system. Since relational inherence is 
explained away, also relational modes (i.e. primitively relating entities) are eliminated from trope 
theory. However, certain tropes, which I call “r-tropes”, will take the role of relational entities in the 
present account. 
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 The different trope bundle theories analyze monadic inherence in different ways. Before 
going to relational inherence, it is instructive to consider two different trope theoretical analyses of 
monadic inherence. According to Keith Campbell’s (1990) classical trope theory, objects are 
mereological sums of mutually co-located (“compresent”) tropes. In this classical view, monadic 
inherence (a trope being a property of an object) can be analyzed in the following way: trope t inheres 
in object i if and if t is a part of i and t is co-located with i.12 According to Campbell’s trope theory, 
tropes are particular natures and mutually co-located parts of objects. A trope is, derivatively, a 
property of an object if it fulfils the just-mentioned condition relative to some object (a sum of co-
located tropes). 
 In contradistinction with Campbell’s trope theory, the trope theory SNT (Keinänen 2011; 
Keinänen & Hakkarainen 2010, 2014) claims that tropes are mutually existentially dependent entities.  
Objects are constituted as aggregates of tropes connected by the formal ontological relations of rigid 
and generic dependence.13 In this article, I provide only a brief description of some features of the 
SNT directly relevant to the present discussion. According to the SNT, every object has either a single 
nuclear trope or, alternatively, two or more tropes rigidly dependent on each other, the nuclear 
tropes.14 Nuclear tropes are necessary parts of an object i and, intuitively, constitute its “necessary 
properties”. Trope t is a part of object i if and only if t is rigidly dependent only on the nuclear tropes 
of i. Object i is a dependence closure of tropes with respect to rigid dependence.15 Because object i 
is a dependence closure of tropes, i is not rigidly dependent on any entity which not its proper part.16 
There are two crucial differences between Campbell’s classical trope theory and the SNT. 
First, the SNT constructs objects from tropes by means of the relations of existential dependence. 
Unlike Campbell’s trope theory, the SNT does not rely on comperesence. Second, the location of 
individual tropes is determined in radically different ways. In Campbell’s trope theory, individual 
tropes are relata of the basic spatio-temporal relations. By contrast, according to the SNT, the certain 
                                                          
12 Since Campbell (1990, secs.4.3-4.4) constructs complex quantity tropes as “conjunctive compresences” of simpler 
tropes falling under the same determinable, an additional maximality condition would be needed to be added to the 
analysis in order to deal with such mutually co-located tropes forming a complex trope. 
13 Let “≤ “ be a relation of improper parthood and  “E!” the predicate of (singular) existence. Entity e is strongly 
rigidly dependent on entity f, if the following condition holds: ¬(□ E!f) & □ ((E!e → E!f) & ¬( f ≤ e )), cf. Simons 
 (1987, 112, 294ff.). 
14 According to the SNT, trope t is a nuclear trope if and only if 1) t is not rigidly dependent on any other trope (a single 
nuclear trope), or 2) t is rigidly dependent on certain trope(s) which are also rigidly dependent on t (two or more nuclear 
tropes). 
15 A dependence closure of tropes with respect to rigid dependence is a plurality of tropes in which all rigid dependencies 
of the tropes in the plurality are fulfilled. Moreover, we assume that necessarily, if these tropes exist, they form an 
individual.  As a consequence, that individual is not rigidly dependent on any mereologically disjoint entity, cf. Keinänen 
(2011, 446-447). 
16 The applicability of the notion of rigid dependence is restricted to contingent existents. 
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kinds of aggregates of tropes (e.g. the nuclear tropes of a substance) form individuals, which are 
minimal relata of the basic spatio-temporal relations. The spatio-temporal locations of these complex 
entities determine the locations of their constituent tropes. In a simple case, object i is constituted 
solely by its nuclear tropes and the location of i determines the location of the tropes that are its proper 
parts. In this simple case, we can analyze monadic inherence as follows: trope t inheres in object i if 
and only if, necessarily, if t exists, t is a proper part of i and t is co-located with i (Keinänen 2011, 
438-440). 
 The purpose of this simplified presentation of the trope theory SNT was to show that the 
theory has enough resources to generalize the analysis of monadic inherence to relational inherence 
(a trope relating two or more entities). The next step is to introduce r-tropes, tropes which take the 
role of relational entities in the proposed account. Like relational modes, r-tropes are multiply rigidly 
dependent (MRD) on two or more entities. In order to rule out trivial cases, I assume that trope r and 
its dependees exist contingently.17 Trope r is multiply rigidly dependent on entities a and b if and 
only if the following three conditions obtain. First, necessarily, if trope r exists, entities a and b (its 
“relata”) also exist. Second, entities a and b are mereologically disjoint and mereologically disjoint 
from r. In other words, the dependees of a multiple rigidly dependent trope are mereologically disjoint 
(“wholly distinct”) entities. Third, entity a is not rigidly dependent on b, or vice versa. In the SNT, 
the third condition guarantees that the dependees of multiply rigidly dependent entities are parts of 
distinct objects. 
 As I remarked above, multiple rigid dependence does not entail relational inherence. I suggest 
that we add three more conditions in order to obtain the conclusion that trope r relates, that is, 
relationally inheres in a and b. I will require that trope r together with its relata forms a complex 
individual, an r-complex rab, which is a spatio-temporally located entity. 
The first two conditions concern the constitution of an r-complex. First, objects a and b are 
the only entities on which trope r is rigidly dependent, r is rigidly dependent only on a and b. Second, 
trope r together with its dependees, a and b, form an individual, an r-complex rab.18 R-complex rab 
is a dependence closure of its proper parts with respect to rigid dependence. As a dependence closure 
of its parts, r-complex rab is itself a strongly rigidly independent entity, it is not rigidly dependent on 
any entity that is mereologically disjoint from rab. Hence, r-complexes are substances in the weak 
sense of being strongly independent particulars and individuals. 
                                                          
17 The characterization of rigid dependence and multiple rigid dependence are thus restricted to contingent 
existents, cf. Simons (1987, 294ff.) for a similar restriction. 
18 Note that every r-complex is an individual and a mereological sum of its parts (e.g., r + a + b = s). 
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The third condition is that r-complex rab is a spatio-temporally located entity: r-complex rab 
has a spatio-temporal location and its location determines the location of its constituent r-trope r. Like 
the objects constituted by their nuclear tropes, an r-complex is a strongly independent particular and 
has all of its proper parts necessarily. Moreover, the location of the r-complex determines the location 
of its existentially dependent part, r-trope r. On the basis of these assumptions, I now propose the 
following analysis of the holding of relational inherence: 
 
[RI]: 
Trope r relationally inheres in a and b if and only if: 
1. r is multiply rigidly dependent (MRD) on a and b, but not rigidly dependent on any entity 
that is not a part of a or a part of b. 
2. a and b are not rigidly dependent on r. 
3. a is not rigidly dependent on b, and b is not rigidly dependent on a. 
4. r, a and b constitute an individual, r-complex rab. 
5. Necessarily, if r exists, r is exactly co-located with rab. 
 
Assume that r is a 1m distance trope. Trope r relates (relationally inheres in) a and b, if r is both 
multiply rigidly dependent on a and b and necessarily exactly co-located with r-complex rab, which 
is a mereological sum of all these three entities (i.e., r+a+b).19 
The purpose of [RI] is to generalize the analysis of monadic inherence of the trope theory 
SNT to r-tropes, which fulfil clauses 1-3 of [RI]. We can achieve this generalization by assuming that 
the corresponding r-complex, whose existence is entailed by the existence of r, is an individual having 
a specific spatio-temporal location. In the SNT, location of an individual determines the location of 
its existentially dependent trope parts. In this special case, the location of an r-complex determines 
the location of an r-trope (the existentially dependent part). Thus, necessarily, if r-trope r exists, it is 
co-located with rab. Consequently, trope r fulfills the conditions of monadic inherence in relation to 
complex rab: necessarily, if r exists, r is a (proper) part of rab and r is co-located with rab. Thus, r 
is a monadic property of complex rab. According to [RI], by being a monadic property of r-complex 
rab, trope r also relationally inheres in a and b. 
Tropes are particular natures (-e charges, 1 m lengths, etc.). One needs to provide an analysis 
of inherence in order to spell out the status of a trope as a property of some object. In the SNT, r-
tropes, like 1 m distance trope r, are particular natures co-located with the corresponding r-complexes 
                                                          
19 In what follows, I leave out the qualification, although I refer to exact co-location when talking about “co-location”. 
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and monadic properties of these r-complexes. Moreover, necessarily, if trope r exists, a and b are 
parts of r-complex rab. Since a and b are proper parts of complex rab, their locations are parts of the 
location of rab.20 Thus, r-trope r is a certain kind of entity that connects mutually distinct entities, a 
and b, into a certain kind of more inclusive whole, the r-complex. In our example, trope r (1 m 
distance trope r) relates entities a and b in a certain way because r “makes” a and b as parts of a 
certain kind of complex individual, 1 m distance r-complex rab. 
 Finally, r-tropes avoid the above two difficulties addressed to relational modes. First, since 
the locations of r-complexes determine the locations of r-tropes, the latter have a determinate location 
as a part of the realm of concrete entities. It is obviously a further issue to provide an account of the 
determination of the location of different kinds of r-complexes. However, I have already outlined 
such an account in the difficult case in which an r-complex contributes to determining the spatial 
location of objects (Keinänen 2018, sec.6). What is essential to the present analysis is that the status 
of r-tropes as spatio-temporally located entities is a direct consequence of their relational inherence. 
 Second, r-tropes avoid the non-modal Bradley’s regress. Relational inherence is analyzed 
away (in terms of parthood, multiple rigid dependence and necessary co-location). Therefore, there 
is no room for speculative claims about the constitution of relational inherence as expressed in the 
non-modal Bradley’s regress. The remaining formal ontological relations in the analysans (multiple 
rigid dependence, rigid dependence and parthood) are basic internal. Since “they” are not relational 
entities, no relation regress can be generated. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this article, I have argued that the eliminativism about relations E.J. Lowe advocates is an appealing 
ontological position in the view of the serious general difficulties one can address to relations. 
However, relations might well be needed in the best a posteriori motivated account of the structure 
of reality. In section 5, I proposed a trope theoretical analysis of relational inherence as a way out this 
dilemma. Although more work is required in this direction, the proposed analysis already shows the 
fruitfulness of the trope theoretical approach in solving the perennial metaphysical problems. 
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